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THECA USE-AND-EFFECT RELA TION
BETWEEN MONEY, PRICES,
AND OUTPUT
ASSEMBLING EVIDENCE on the behavior of the three determinants of the
money stock has taken us far afield—into details of financial history
for high-powered money, into various aspects of consumer behavior
for the currency ratio, and into many of the developments in banking
and other financial institutions for the reserve ratio.Even though
frequently tentative, the findings help to show how far changes in the
money stock can be regarded as resulting from concurrent variations
in prices and output and how far they occurred independently of such
variations. In this respect, the findings bear upon the causal connection
between the money stock, on the one hand, and prices and output,
on the other.
Chapter 1 summarizes the evidence on the covariation of cyclical
movements in money and economic activity; the first section of' this
chapter documents an equally close covariation over longer periods
between changes in the money stock and in prices. The covariation
was either accidental, which is hardly plausible, or reflected a one-way
or mutual dependence between the variables.This chapter is con-
cerned with the direction of influence: whether the dependence is
mutual or runs primarily from money to prices and output or primarily
from prices and output to money.
The method of inquiry will be to examine the effects of price and
output movements on the three determinants of the money stock to
see whether such effects are sufficient to explain the observed co-
variation. Insofar as these effects are not sufficient, the implication is
that the covariation reflects in large part the reverse effect of changes in
the money stock on prices and output. Directions of influence can thus
be determined, at least to some degree, by extending the evidence ofCAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION 235
previous chapters on the factors affecting the determinants of the
money stock.
The radical difference between short- and long-run sources of change
in the money stock advises a separate treatment, as in the preceding
chapters, of secular and cyclical movements.In the discussion of
secular movements, taken up first, changes in the rate of growth of
real income and output are largely ignored and attention is confined
to price changes, though a concluding section adds some remarks on
variations in the secular growth of output.
1. Secular Movements in Money and Prices
THE EVIDENCE
If long-run price changes produced the variations in growth of the
money stock, they must have done so through one or more of the
three determinants.Accordingly, to determine whether the money
stock or the price level is the independent variable in their long-run
association, we may start by examining the possible effects of price
changes on secular movements in the three determinants.
Identifying the source of secular movements in the money stock is
greatly simplified by the dominant contribution of one determinant.
Chapter 2 shows that changes in high-powered money accounted for
nine-tenths of the over-all growth in the money stock from 1875 to
1955. In the first half of the period, from 1875 to 1917, this fraction
was only 68 per cent, mainly because of a steady decline in the cur-
rency-money ratio, which accounted for most of the remaining growth
of the money stock. From 1919 to 1955 and excluding World War II,
the fraction attributable to high-powered money was more than 100
per cent. The currency ratio was slightly lower in 1955 than in 1919,
the reserve ratio slightly higher; together, the changes in the two ratios
alone would have produced a small decline in the money stock during
that period. The expansion of high-powered money contributed over
100 per cent because it more than offset the negative contribution of
the two ratios.
Table 28 indicates that the two ratios played a minor role in most
subperiods as well. The table gives eighteen average rates of change in
the variables between successive reference cycle bases from 1877























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CORRELATIONBETWEENSECULAR IN PRICES AND
IN THE t()NEYSTOCK ITSSOURCES,
RANK CORRELATIONCOEFFICIENT5 BETWEEN AVERAGE RATES OF
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aSignificance levels are based, for top two on the t test; for bottom
two lines,on E. C. Olds, "Distributions of Sums of Squares of Rank Differences
for Small Numbers of Individuals," Annals of Statistics, June 1938,
pp. Table IV.Use of figures for two earlier teference cycles (see






Same as in Table 28.
CThat is, the average rate of change of high-powered money, minus theaverage
rate for the gold stock.
s significantly different from zero at .025 level or less.
ss significantly different from zero at .001 level or less.
n not significantly different from zero at .10 level.
No citation means significantly different from zero at a level between .05
and .10.238 CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION
for comparison. The rates were computed from the average levels of
the variables, trough-to-trough of each reference cycle, in order to elim-
inate cyclical variations. While no measure eliminates them entirely,
this particular one is likely to be as effective as any. The importance
of high-powered money is evident from the high fraction of the growth
of the money stock attributable to it in most of the subperiods. When
the fraction attributable to it was low, moreover, the growth of the
money stock usually was comparatively small or negative.Put dif-
ferently, variations in the growth of high-powered money and of the
money stock were nearly proportional:the regression coefficient of
column 3 on column 2 of the table is 0.88, and the square of the cor-
relation coefficient is 0.84.Variations in the secular growth of the
money stock have a much lower correlation with the contributions of
the other two determinants.
Table 29 summarizes the evidence by means of some correlation
coefficients derived from Table 28. They show that, before 1914 and
for the period as a whole, price changes correlated with variations
in the growth of the money stock much more closely than with any
of the sources of those variations separately.All the correlations
except that with gold after 1919 are positive. This is to be expected if
the major direction of influence is from money to prices, since each
determinant is then associated with price movements through its
effect on money. Any discrepancies between changes in the money
stock and in one of its determinants will tend to make the correlation
between prices and that determinant lower than between prices and
money. The higher correlation between money and prices might be
consistent with the opposite direction of influence, from prices to
money, if prices affected most of the determinants in a positive direc-
tion. The higher correlation between money and prices might then
reflect a combination of the price effects on each determinant.' But
prices affect the gold stock negatively, and probably did not strongly
affect the other sources of change in high-powered money in a positive
direction, either.2 Any effects of prices on the money stock in a positive
1Whenthe intercorrelation among the determinants is fairly low, the correlation
coefficient between prices and money will exceed an average of the coefficients between
prices and each determinant.
2Thepositive correlations in Table 29 are no indication of such effects.If changes
in the money stock affect prices, then prices will for this reason alone show a correlation
with components of the money stock, which may explain a large part, possibly all,
of the correlation shown in cols. 2 to 5 in Table 29.CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION 239
direction must have occurred entirely through the currency and re-
serve ratios or, at most, through all the nongold sources of change in
the money stock. Yet, before 1914 and for the period as a whole, the
correlation of prices with those nongold sources, singly or in com-
bination, is substantially weaker than it is with the money stock itself,
and is even negative for the pre-1914 period. An effect running
primarily from prices to money would produce a higher (positive)
correlation of prices with the nongold sources of change in the money
stock than with the money stock itself; and it would produce a negative
correlation of prices with changes in the gold stock.Neither is ob-
served for the pre-1914 period.
The correlations for the post-l9l9 period, taken alone, are con-
sistent with either or both directions of influence. The correlation of
prices with the gold stock is moderately negative and yet strongly
positive with the other determinants and with the total money stock—a
result of the contribution of Federal Reserve credit. The correlation in
column 5, higher than that in column 1, would point to an effect
running primarily from prices to money if certain conditions prevailed:
if the difference were large and significant—as it is not—and if the
behavior of the determinants could be attributed tO price effects.
The preceding chapters provide no evidence, however, of such price
effects. For that reason, the high correlation between prices and the
money stock for the post-1919 period offers evidence for the im-
portance of the opposite effect, running from money to prices, even
though the observed correlations of prices with the determinants for
that period offer no evidence either way. On this interpretation, the
high correlations in columns 3 to 5 for the post-1919 period reflect
primarily the effect of money on prices.
These comparisons are based on rank correlation coefficients. The
differences between the coefficients are large and so appear significant,
but unfortunately appropriate tests of significance do not exist. To
conduct suchtests,the product-moment correlationcoefficients
presented in the tabulation on p. 240 serve as an addendum to the table.
They cover the period 1877—1954 for the three most relevant variables:
prices, the money stock, and the nongold sources of change in the
money stock.These coefficients are larger than the corresponding
ones in Table 29, because the extreme values, which receive greater
weight, lie near the same linear regression that fits the other values.240 CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION
PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
BETWEEN AVERAGE RATES OF CHANGE
IN PRICES AND
Money Stock Attributed to
Ratio of High-Powered
Reference Money Jt'Ianey to Gold Stock and to




By Hotelling's test,3 the difference between the coefficients in the two
columns for both lines is significant at the 0.025 level, thereby con-
firming the impressions derived from Table 29 for the whole period
that the major direction of influence is from money to prices.
The implication of this evidence, even for the pre-1914 period, is
not that prices had no effects on the determinants but that those
effects are insufficient to explain the long-run covariation between
prices and the total money stock.Such effects probably did occur,
though usually not in the direction required to explain the covariation.
Treasury operations and silver purchases tended at times to expand
high-powered money, when the growth of the gold stock was low and
prices were falling, and conversely. For example, the ratio of high-
powered money to the gold stock, as shown by Chart 4, was higher in
the 1880's and 1890's when prices were falling, than in the following
two decades when prices were rising. The ratio was at its lowest point
during the 1930's when the growth rate of the gold stock was highest.
Treasury operations as a whole have blunted the impact on the money
stock of changes in the rate of gold production, which may in part be
the reason for the negative correlations for the pre-i 914 period (columns
3 to 5 of Table 29). For the later period, that effect was either not
strong or was more effectively counteracted by positive covaiiations
reflecting the effect of money on prices.
SeeHarold Hotelling, "The Selection of Variates for Use in Prediction with
Some Comments on the General Problem of Nuisance Parameters," Annals of Mathe-
matical Statistics, Sept. 1940, pp. 271—283. This test takes account of the association
between the money stock and its nongold components; the correlation coefficient
between them is 0.79 for nonwar and 0.77 for all cycles. The test is designed to
answer the question: Which predicts prices better, the money stock or its nongold
components? It is not entirely appropriate for use in this study, which asks a different
question: Does the money stock predict prices better than prices predict the nongold
components? How the different use may affect the results of the test is not apparent.CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION 241
Insofar as movements in interest rates and prices were correlated,
there was a tendency toward expansion of issues of national bank notes
when prices and interest rates rose, and conversely. But that was a
minor factor in the growth of high-powered money.
As for the currency and reserve ratios, analysis of their long-run
behavior did not reveal a dependence on prices. To be sure, some of
the largest deviations of the ratios from their long-run trends reflected
financial panics, which were accompanied by sharp price swings.
While temporary, those price swings often left an imprint on the data
covering a longer period than the business cycles in which the swings
originated. Since the greater part of the price swings came after rather
than before each panic, however, the jump in the ratios, which was
immediate, reflected the panic rather than the ensuing behavior of
prices.
Interest rates had some effects on the two ratios. A rise in rates paid
on time and savings deposits appears to reduce the demand for cur-
rency, though if general interest rates also rise, the demand for com-
mercial bank deposits may decline, moderating the reduction in the
ratio of currency to the money stock. A rise in interest rates also
induces a shift from demand to time deposits, which reduces the re-
quired reserve ratio of banks and hence the total reserve ratio. These
effects produce a slight positive relation between interest rates and the
money stock (defined to include time deposits). No effect was found,
however, of an effect of interest rates on the usable reserve ratio.
Insofar as prices and interest rates move together, prices can affect
the money stock through these channels. The effects operate mainly in
the long run, however, and shifts between demand and time deposits
had little effect before 1914, when reserve requirements only for some
state banks distinguished between the two kinds of deposits.
The behavior of Treasury operations and the two ratios, however
interpreted, is largely irrelevant to the present discussion, since together
they account for only a small part of the secular variations in monetary
growth. If the effects of prices on money are to explain the long-run
covariation between them, they must have occurred largely through
high-powered money.It happens that two important components of
high-powered money—the gold stock and Federal Reserve credit
outstanding—are or might be thought to be dependent upon price
movements.The evidence pertainingtothese two components242 CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION
should be reviewed, therefore, with a discussion also of some of the
possible objections to the conclusions derived from Table 29.
The Gold Stock. The growth of the domestic gold stock (Chapter 3)
was broken down into two parts: one, from growth of the world stock
through production in excess of current consumption in industry and
arts;and the other, from changes in the U .S. share of the world stock
through international trade.Both made substantial contributions.
How were they affected by price movements?
The growth of the world gold stock is closely affected by changes in
commodity prices. So long as some governments commit themselves
to the gold standard and exchange their currency for gold at a fixed
rate, the production and nonmonetary uses of gold depend on the
general level of prices in gold-standard countries. When that level
falls, the real value of gold in terms of commodities rises. The rise
enhances the incentive to find new mines and new means of refining
gold-bearing ores and to substitute other metals for gold in industry
and arts, leaving more of current world production to be added to the
monetary stock. When prices rise, the reverse occurs:profits from
mining gold fall, and output is curtailed, inducements to increase the
sources of supply fade, and nonmonetary uses expand. That price
changes affect world gold production and with varying lags is con-
firmed by the evidence examined in Chapter 3.
A given country's share of the world gold stock is affected by its
balance of payments, which incorporates the trade and the capital
balance and includes effects of changes in monetary standards and of
foreign central bank actions. So long as its internal prices change in
rough proportion to world prices and there are no drastic changes in
either the pattern of international trade and capital flows or the
quantity of domestic currency and deposits created per unit of gold
by monetary institutions, its share will vary more or less in proportion
to the size of its national output relative to world output. Changes in
the purchasing-power parity of each country's currency also have an
important effect on its share. A fall in the level of internal prices
relative to world prices will ordinarily increase the gold inflow and
the total stock—and conversely, if internal prices rise.In this respect,
internal price movements affect domestic gold stocks in the same
direction that world price movements affect the world gold stock.
Such effects on the secular growth of the U.S. gold stock and theirCA USE-A ND-EFFECT RELATION 243
varying lags are discussed in Chapter 3•4 A good example is provided
by the well-defined turn during the mid-1890's in the long-run trend
of prices. The cumulative effect of falling world prices from 1873 to
the 1890's increased world gold production and eventually also the
growth of the world and the U.S. gold stock—but not until the mid-
1890's. A similar reaction occurred during the 1930's but much more
rapidly. That is probably why concurrent changes in prices and the
gold stock have even a slightly negative correlation in Table 29 for
the post-l919 period, in contrast to the strongly positive correlation
for the pre-1914 period.
It is important to note the lags in these effects, because the positive
relation between concurrent changes in prices and the gold stock
before 1914 is opposite to that produced by the lagged effects just
described. To extend the foregoing example: when the growth of the
gold stock finally responded in the mid-l890's to the long decline in
world prices which had started in 1873, prices began a long-run rise.
The coincidence of turns cannot be attributed to the effect of price
movements on the gold stock; that effect is a lagged inverse relation
between prices and the gold stock. Furthermore, if price movements
had an entirely nonmonetary origin, they would not except by ac-
cident coincide with movements of the gold stock in the same direction.
Yet, generally, the gold stock grew slowly during the latter 1800's,
just so long as prices fell, and subsequently grew rapidly, just so long
as prices rose.It seems far more plausible to attribute this positive
correlation, not to chance, but to the effect of changes in the gold
stock on the money stock and hence on prices.
If prices affected -the gold stock with little or no lag, there would
have been little long-run variation in prices before 1914 except as a
result of autonomous changes in gold production, since changes in the
gold stock accounted for most of the long-run changes in the money
stock. Changes in the price level would have been limited by a tight
feedback-control mechanism. The lagged reaction of the gold stock
to changes in commodity prices, therefore, is what makes the gold
standard a poor means of stabilizing the price level, rather than
failure of gold-stock changes to affect prices—as often contended.
That discussion is couched in terms of the commodity value of gold instead of
commodity prices;the former moves inversely to prices and also takes account of
changes in the gold content of the dollar.244 CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION
After 1914, the long-run effect of prices on the gold stock appears to
have had a much shorter lag. Yet, long-run variations in prices could
and did still occur, because long-run changes in the gold stock were
no longer the sole major determinant of secular growth of the money
stock.
The preceding explanation of the lagged covariation between
prices and the gold stock might be combined with one of two separate
explanations for the concurrent covariation.(1) Whenever domestic
prices rose (say), the rise was less rapid than the rise in prices abroad,
and so domestic prices actually fell in relation to world prices. Then,
gold would have flowed in and produced the observed rise in the U.S.
stock;and conversely, for a decline in domestic prices.This ex-
planation posits a relation between domestic and world price move-
ments that would hold for no particular reason other than chance
and so would be unlikely to prevail, except occasionally. Moreover,
the available data for other countries, mainly Great Britain, do not
show such behavior of relative price levels;and, contrary to this
explanation, they do not show a concurrent covariation between the
British gold stock and prices opposite to that for the United States.
(2)Another explanation of the concurrent covariation,intel-
lectually more interesting but also unsatisfactory, starts with the as-
sumption that long-run domestic price changes were accompanied,
for various reasons, by movements of domestic interest rates in the
same direction.If these movements were sufficient to produce cor-
responding movements in domestic rates relative to world levels, and
if the resulting international rate differentials led to capital movements,
gold would flow in a direction to produce the observed positive co-
variation between gold and prices. Bond yields, at least in this country
and Great Britain, have moved in the same direction as prices have-----
the so-called "Gibson Paradox," discussed in detail later. The first
part of this explanation, therefore, appears consistent with the facts.
Beyond that, it encounters difficulties.To begin with, there is no
indication that interest rate differentials here and abroad moved in the
suggested manner.5 Furthermore, what data we have on long-run
capital movements, unreliable as they may be, indicate that capital
See Oskar Morgenstern, International Financial Transactions and Business Cycles,
Princeton University Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959, Charts
18, 19, 20, 58, 60, and 61. Compare the periods before and after the upsurge of the
U.S. gold stock in 1896.CA USE-A ND-EFFECT RELATION 245
was imported on a large scale into this country during the latter part
ofthe nineteenth century, when domestic prices were falling and the
growth of the gold stock was slower than its secular trend. They also
indicate that the capital inflow fell ofT abruptly after the turn of the
century, when prices were rising and the growth of the gold stock
exceeded its long-run trend.6This explanation, however, would
require the opposite relation in both cases.
Both these explanations pertain to movements in the U.S. share of
the world gold stock and so imply opposite movements in the share
of the rest of the world. Both overlook entirely, therefore, the general
uniformity of long-run price movements for all gold-standard countries
and the tendency of these movements to coincide with the growth
rates of the world gold stock.Capital movements, in general, and
those responding to international interest-rate differentials, in par-
ticular, have no doubt affected the distribution of the world gold
stock.Nevertheless, interest rates cannot explain the long-run move-
ments in the gold stock of the United States or of all countries together.
We are therefore led to interpret secular movements in the traditional
way: The growth of the U.S. gold stock was much slower in the
first half than in the second half of the pre-Worid \'Var I period for
two reasons.Primarily, it was because the rate of world production
was slower and, secondarily, because the required reduction in the
growth rate of the U.S. stock was delayed for various reasons, the
chief one being the preparations for resumption of convertibility in
1879. The domestic monetary disturbances over silver in the 1890's
then carried the reduction, once begun, too far which, together with
the rapid growth of the U.S. economy, led to a rise in the U.S. share
in the second part of the pre-l9l4 period.By this interpretation,
therefore, the effect of prices on gold flows and production cannot
explain the positive correlation for the pre-1914 period, shown in
column 2 of Table 29. Even if it could, such an effect certainly cannot
explain the much higher correlation between prices and the money
stock for that period, shown in column
°SeeMilton Friedman and Anna .Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the
United States, 1869—1960, Princeton for NBER, 1963, pp. 102 and 140 if.
Sincecapital movements can be expected to reflect opportunities for profitable
investment, it is plausible that high growth of output which presses against capacity
attracts capita( from abroad. Hence, during a period of rapid growth (like the 1880's),
induced capital movements may offset part of a trade deficit arising from high246 CAUSE-A ND-EFFECT RELA TIO N
Federal ReserveCreditOutstanding. Federal Reserve powers have
sometimes been used to offset or reinforce the other determinants in
order to achieve desired changes in the money stock.If price move-
ments were relevant to the purposes for which these powers were
used, such movements might have influenced the behavior of high-
powered money.It is conceivable, therefore, that this influence has
worked since the founding of the Federal Reserve Banks in the direction
required to produce the observed correlation between long-run move-
ments in prices and in the money stock. For example, Federal Reserve
Banks might have extended credit in response to the market demand
for loans. If so, they might have produced movements in high-powered
money corresponding to those in prices and real output, which could
account for the long-run correlation observed between money and
prices.In that event, little of the correlation need necessarily be
attributed to the effect of money on prices.
This or any similar explanation of the correlation nevertheless
seems highly unreal. A central bank's freedom from the profit-and-
loss restraints facing commercial enterprises and its dedication to the
general welfare are expected to lead to just the opposite result. A
central bank's credit policy is normally designed to counteract price
movements, not to reinforce them.During the Reserve System's
first three decades, of course, its officials did not fully accept that
goal. At first, official explanations of its policy were tinged with the
"real bills" doctrine, which required that credit be increased when
merchandise imports; and, conversely, for slow growth (as during most of the 1890's).
(See J. G. Williamson, "Real Growth, Monetary Disturbances and the Transfer Pro-
cess: The United States, 1879—1900,"Southern Economic Journal,Jan. l963,pp. 167—180.)
It is conceivable also that the capital movements may dominate, thus causing the
balance of payments to improve and gold to flow in when domestic output expands;
and conversely. This might then explain an association between the money stock
and prices.
It cannot explain the major movements over the pre-1914 period, however, although
it might account for some of the shorter-run variations within those movements. In
general, capital movements, whether or not influenced by the growth rate of output,
did not completely offset the trade balance and, over the long run, gold flows reflected
largely the movements in the trade balance. (Williamson's interesting and suggestive
discussion cited above is handicapped by understating the importance of gold flows,
which he found not closely related to changes in the money stock on a year-to-year
basis. He overlooks the cumulative effect of gold flows.) That gold flows were some-
times offset temporarily by nongold sources of change in high-powered money does
not mean that long-run changes in the money stock were determined by capital
movements or the growth rate of domestic output. The offsets were not that important
and, moreover, can be largely explained by other factors.RELATION 247
business, and so the "needs of trade," expanded—and conversely.
In wartime it devoted itself to the Treasury's budgetary needs. Never-
theless, the historical record does not indicate that extensions of Federal
Reserve credit were intended to conform positively to price move-
ments. The record indicates the reverse, if anything. Federal Reserve
policies seem to have reflected other, chiefly short-run considerations
(see Chapter 3).
In part, of course, Federal Reserve policies took account of the level
of employment, and it might be argued that dedication to the main-
tenance of "full" employment could link the money stock to prices
and so account for the observed correlation between them.Post-
World War II events have been widely interpreted along these lines,
as follows: Because downward movements in prices and wages are
impeded by rigidities which have become more entrenched in the last
two decades or so, business recessions no longer produce as much
deflation of prices as in the past, but mainly lead to reductions in
output and employment. To maintain full employment, the Federal
Reserve increases high-powered money and thereby the money stock
until a revival in business activity promises to restore full employment,
possible oniy if the money stock is increased enough to support the pre-
vailing level of prices and wages.In the absence of decline during
recession, the level reached by prices and wages in each boom is thereby
sustained.Transitory upward impulses in the price level are made
permanent, which puts it in a meta-stable equilibrium. Under such
circumstances we have a modern equivalent of the old real bills
doctrine, in which the needs of trade are replaced by the "inviolability
of full employment."
The foregoing argument assumes that increases in the money stock
are necessary to maintain each upward step of prices and so takes for
granted that such increases affect prices. The argument could be
modified, however, to contend that this Federal Reserve policy ac-
counts for the long-run correlation between money and prices, but
that the System's belief that it must increase the stock of money to
promote recovery is mistaken. Even if the System did not respond as
it is alleged to do, the long-run rise in prices would be the same,
because it results from various pressures wholly unrelated to changes
in the money stock. This reasoning is implicit in much literature and,
for that reason at least, deserves consideration.248 CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION
Although high-powered money and the money stock could at times
be determined in the foregoing manner, it seems clear that they have
not been for most of the period since the founding of the Federal
Reserve Banks. Whatever the merits of the wage-price spiral as an
explanation of changes in the money stock for some part of the period
since World War II, it can hardly explain the experience of either the
pre-World War II period (except perhaps 1933—37) or the major part
of the period since. In the first place, prices and wages were not very
rigid in previous periods; before World War II declines were frequent
and sometimes of considerable size.More important, the largest
historical changes in Federal Reserve credit outstanding were un-
related to insistence on full employment; they were the increases
during wartime and the decreases in 1921 and 1931. The increase in
Federal Reserve credit outstanding in 1950, when the outbreak of
the Korean War created fear of shortages and produced scare buying,
might be interpreted as a "passive response" to an upsurge in
demand. The increase came, however, from sale of bonds by member
banks to Federal Reserve Banks and was permitted, not to stimulate
fullemployment, but toperpetuate the support of U.S. bond
prices.
Although the evidence for the post-l919 period summarized in
Table 29 neither proves nor disproves that changes in the money stock
affected prices, itis hardly credible that the effect of money-stock
changes was uniniportant.First, the data before 1914 can be fully
explained, as was shown, only by an effect of money on prices;if a
1percent change in the money stock had certain effects then, a 1per
cent change must have had largely the same effects after 1914.It is
most unlikely that the economy underwent structural changes of a
kind to alter those effects.One can imagine—though reasons are
hard to find—that developments since 1914 in financial markets and
emergence of assorted substitutes for money might have altered the
speed with which those effects occurred, but not the ultimate result.
Second, it is far-fetched to explain the over-all behavior of Federal
Reserve credit outstanding in the interwar years or in the post-World
War II period as rigidly tied to a full employment policy—and to
argue that the Reserve Banks pursued such a policy without the means
to implement it.In fact, their actions had varied purposes and results,
none of which closely paralled a full-employment policy. On the whole,CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATiON 249
price effects on Federal Reserve credit outstanding seem unable to
account for the very high correlations for this period, shown in Table
29.Though covering only seven cycle-to-cycle changes, the rank
correlation coefficient of 0.79 is highly significant. The most plausible
explanation is that changes in the growth of the money stock produced
most of the associated movements in prices.
SOME LONG-STANDING OBJECTIONS RECONSIDERED
The above interpretation of the U.S. data since the Civil War is
the same, aside from details, as that adopted for England and Europe
by many classical economists of the last century, though their data
were inadequate to support a detailed analysis. Jevons' discussion was
unusually explicit and may serve as one of the best examples:
Between 1809 and 1849 we notice a vast decline of prices. ...Since[1849]
the course of prices seems to have been entirely altered, and a permanent rise
has been established.. ..Evenif it were [individual] commodities which
were altered in their conditions of supply and demand, the result would not
the less be an alteration in the purchasing power or value of gold. But con-
sidering that. .. amost extraordinary change has taken place in the conditions
of supply, the probability is excessively great that we find the true cause in the
gold discoveries.
To complete the argument, I have only to ask those who think that the
growth of population, the increase of demand, or the progress of trade is the
cause of the rise of prices, whether population, demand, trade, etc., were not
expanding before 1849, not so rapidly perhaps as since, but still expanding;
and how it is that causes of the same kind have produced falling prices before
1849 and rising prices since? ...Ithink that the growth of population and
trade tend to lower prices by increasing the use of gold, and to this cause we
may reasonably attribute the fall of prices before 1849. But to attribute to the
same cause, as some do, the diametrically opposite change which has occurred
since 1849, is illogical in the extreme. The normal course of prices in the
present progressive state of things is,I think, downwards; but for twenty
years at least this normal course has been checked or even reversed, and why
should we hesitate to attribute this abnormal effect to the contemporary and
extraordinary discoveries of gold ?8
W. Stanley Jevons, letter to The Economist, May 8, 1869, reprinted in his In-
in Currency and Finance, London, 1894, pp. 155—158. Similar statements of
other writers are too numerous to Cite, though the very astute observations ofJohn E.
Cairnes should at least be mentioned: "Essay Toward a Solution of the Gold Question"
in Essays in Political Economy, London, 1873. On the development of these ideas, see
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Criticism of this view, widespread from the beginning, has intensified
since the 1930's. An early and continuing objection has been that the
data fail to show a very close association between movements in money
and prices.Analysis of the U.S. data invalidates this objection.
Although the association is not perfect, it is closer than is typically
required in economics to confirm a relationship between variables.
If one concludes from the evidence that price movements in the
United States reflect primarily changes in the money stock, the same
explanation must apply to all countries, including England, that were
on the gold standard and had close commercial ties with the United
States.There cannot be one explanation of major long-run price
movements for this country and another for England, at least while
both countries adhere to the gold standard.The objection that
arose to Jevons' view is understandable, however. Early critics of the
classical interpretation did not have good data.Until recently the
U.S. data lacked complete coverage, with the relative importance of
the missing parts unknown; and the accuracy of the data for other
countries was even less.Worse still, their inaccuracy was not fully
appreciated. The inadequate data for England then available were
used to justify the contention of a poor association. New estimates of
English bank deposits for the nineteenth though still far from
satisfactory, suggest that the association was just as close during that
period as it was in the United States,9In any event, the proponents
and critics of classical monetary doctrines intended their arguments
to apply to all gold-standard countries, including the United States,
and for this country the critics were in error.
See René P. Higonnet, "Bank Deposits in the United Kingdom 1870—1914,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Aug. 1957, pp. 329—367.
An article by J. T. Phinney in the early 1930's ("Gold Production and the Price
Level: The Cassel Three Per Cent Estimate," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Aug.
1933, pp. 647—679, especially sect. IV) argued that the ratio of the money stock
to the gold stock for each of several Western countries was not constant over the last
half of the 19th century. The evidence refuted the views of Cassel and others that
an appropriate constant rate of growth in the gold stock would produce "monetary
equilibrium."Though Phinney drew no further conclusions, his results left the
implication that the gold stock did not account for most of the growth of the money
stock during that period. Such a belief could have reinforced the widespread view
that gold production had little relation to money-stock changes and even less to price
movements. It seems to have been implicitly assumed that nongold contributions to
changes in the money stock, alleged by Phinney to be important, made the association
between money and prices more tenuous than that between prices and the gold stock.
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Aside from long-run movements, the monetary data for most
countries were sufficient, at least for certain periods, to show short-run
swings. Studying this evidence, many observers have denied that the
money stock is closely associated with prices and output in the short
run;on these grounds they have rejected the classical monetary
theory, even though it pertained for the most part to long-run move-
ments. Many concluded that periods of business stagnation and low
prices often coincide with a money stock that is rising, sometimes
faster than its long-run trend. Since the 1930's, the evidence on that
decade has become Exhibit A of this argument.Aside from such
extreme episodes, which usually followed banking panics and so may
be interpreted as reflecting instead the aftereffects of severe monetary
disturbances, the evidence as a whole does reveal a short-run associa-
tiori—not perfect but still fairly close—between output and the rate
of change in the money stock (see Chapter 1 and the discussion below).
The important point, however, is that the short-run evidence, no
matter how interpreted, is largely irrelevant to the long run. We are
often told that the long run is composed of a succession of short runs,
in supposed proof of the analytical equivalence of the two time spans.
The proof is false, because what is true of the short run is not also
necessarily true of the long run.Effects that are important in the
short run may be relatively unimportant in the long run, and vice
versa, for two reasons: First, nonmonetary factors may hide the effects
of changes in the money stock over the duration of a business cycle.
If such factors are entirely cyclical and are unrelated to the money-
stock changes, they tend to cancel out in the long run. The long run
should therefore be defined as a period long enough for any such
shift in the relative importance of variables to show up.Second,
changes in the money stock may induce offsetting variations in the
demand to hold money. The effects of the money-stock changes are
thereby halted, but only temporarily unless the variations in demand
are permanent. When these offsets wear off, the monetary effects
appear, though with a lag. The short-run effect of these changes is no
evidence therefore of their long-run importance. The record of short-
run movements, irrelevant as it is and misinterpreted as it has been in
addition, has served in the past, probably more than any other con-
sideration, to discredit the importance of changes in the money stock
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Another objection to the classical monetary theory for the long run
was suggested by the Gibson Paradox—the observation that concur-
rent, secular movements in the price level and in long-term interest
rates appear to be in the same direction.'°This appeared to con-
tradict the implications of the classical theory, because changes in the
money stock might be expected to affect prices and interest rates in
opposite directions.Under the institutional arrangements widely
prevalent in commercial and industrial economies, changes in the
money stock occur primarily through the banking system, and banks
expand or contract credit by lowering or raising their interest rates
on loans, which would induce similar movements in open-market
rates. When prices are rising, therefore, interest rates should be low;
and conversely. How explain the opposite behavior of interest rates?
Since this behavior appears in the long run, it cannot be explained
simply by the tendency of prices and interest to ride in the same
direction up and down the business cycle.
An intriguing explanation of the paradox was offered by Wicksell
and later by Keynes." They advanced two propositions:(1) large
and prolonged fluctuations in the demand schedule for loanable funds
occur as a result of changes in the rate of return on producers' goods;
and (2) bank rates on loans follow with a lag changes in the demand
schedule for loans. In consequence, the supply of bank loans increases
when the demand for loans rises and decreases when the demand
falls.Such changes in the amount of loanable funds supplied reflect
changes in the money stock, and, in terms of its three determinants,
can be attributed to changes in the reserve ratio. When loan demand
rises, banks raise their charges, but not sufficiently to prevent loans
outstanding from increasing, thus allowing their reserve ratios to fall;
and conversely, when loan demand falls.In Wicksell's terms, the
bank rate lags behind the natural (i.e., equilibrating) rate of interest.
The resulting changes in the money stock convert thefluctu-
ations in demand for loanable funds into corresponding fluctuations
in commodity prices.Thus isallegedly produced the association
10Sonamed by John Maynard Keynes (see his A Treatise on Money, New York,
Harcourt, Brace, Vol. II, 1930, p. 198) after A. H. Gibson, who wrote several articles
on the phenomenon (see especially Banker's Magazine, London, Jan. 1923, pp. 15—34).
It had been discussed by other economists earlier.
"SeeKeynes, A Treatise on Money, pp. 198—208; K. Lectures on Political
Economy, London, Vol. II, 1935, pp. 190—208, and Interest and Prices, London, 1936.CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION 253
between movements in money, prices, and interest, all following the
independent, initiating fluctuations inthe demand for loanable
funds.
For Wicksell and Keynes, adaptation of the money stock to changes
in loan demand is a necessary condition for the price movements, in
the sense that, as both would have argued, prices could not, at least
in the long run, fluctuate without supporting changes in the money
stock.'2 Changes in the money stock and in prices both result from
fluctuations in the demand for loanable funds or, more basically, from
fluctuations in the rate of return on capital, reflecting nonmonetary
("real") developments in the economy.This interpretation is not
simply the old classical theory in modern attire.'3 Although it recog-
nizes that changes in the money stock arc a necessary condition of
price movements, this interpretation regards such changes as dependent
on other factors that initiate the movements. The classical theory
does not remain intact, but is undermined in two ways: First, since
monetary institutions and the supply of gold do not produce in-
dependent changes in the money stock but respond to factors orig-
inating elsewhere in the economy, one does not look to these institutions
and the gold supply for explanations of price movements but to the
factors affecting the demand for loariable funds and the rate of return
on capital. Second, if changes in the money stock are not independent
of movements in prices and loan demand, how do we know such
changes are in fact a necessary condition? After all, if the association
between money and prices can be explained by a link running from
loan demand to money to prices, there is no direct evidence that price
movements depend on changes in the money stock. Perhaps if govern-
ment measures broke the dependence, that is, kept the rate of growth
of the money stock constant (say), prices and interest rates would
continue their long-run fluctuations as before, without any important
alteration. From this point, it is one short step to the assertion that
changes in the money stock are not necessary for long-run price
movements. All that needs to be proved is that historical price move-
ments were produced by nonmonetary factors. The proof has never
12Bothwriters appear to have recognized that changes iii the demand to hold
money induced by interest-rate movements would not be large enough to account for
long-run swings in prices.
13Forthe counter view, see Lauchlin Currie, The Supply and Gontrol of Money in the
United States, Harvard University Press, 1934, pp. 4—9.254 CA USE-A ND-EFFECT RELATION
been supplied, but candidates for such factors have abounded.In
the reasoning of later writers, changes in the money stock, though not
considered to be totally unimportant, receded into the background
and were neglected;interpretation of the experience in the l930's
then cemented the position that major price movements often bear
little relation to changes in the money stock.'4
The Wicksell-Keynes theory implies particular routes whereby
long-run changes in the money stock are brought about.Wicksell
argued that variations in banks' reserve ratios would follow fluctuations
in the natural rate of interest and so produce conforming movements
in the money stock. Keynes argued that central banks and govern-
ments would perform the same function by allowing the ratio of their
gold reserve to their monetary liabilities to contract when interest
rates rose, and to expand when rates fell.'5 The facts for the United
States before 1914, which provide the clearest evidence of the Gibson
Paradox, correspond with neither of these patterns. Neither changes
in banks' reserve ratios nor in the ratio of the domestic gold stock to
high-powered money account for any sizable part of the long-run
movements in the U.S. money stock before 1914. Moreover, the long..
run movements that occurred in banks' reserve ratios can be better
explained by changes in legal requirements and banking practices
than by factors related to the long-run demand for loanable funds.
Movements in the ratio of the gold stock to high-powered money can
be better explained by the government's response to gold flows than
to changes in interest rates. The US. monetary authorities cushioned
the economy against variations in the growth of the gold stock. In the
pre-1914 period, the cushioning was incomplete, and most of the
variations in the gold stock were still transmitted to the money stock.
Consequently, the gold ratio was lower before 1896 when prices were
falling than from 1896 to World War I when prices were rising. That
is the reverse of the relation implied by Keynes' argument.
"See, for example, E. H. Phelps Brown and S. A. Ozga, "Economic Growth and
the Price Level," The Economic Journal, Mar. 1955, PP. 1—18, especially pp. 1—8.
See also W. W. Rostow, "Explanations of the Great Depression" (of the 1890's),
Chap. VII in his British Economy of the Nineteenth Century, Oxford, 1948;Wicksell,
Interest and Prices, Appendix; and B. Ohlin, "On the Quantity Theory of Money" in
Money, Growth, and Methodology, in Honor ofJohan Akerman, Sweden, 1961, especially
pp. 113—120.
" Wicksell,Interest and Prices, Chap. 8; Keynes, A Treatise on Money, p. 205.CA USE-AND-EFFECT RELATION 255
\'Vicksell and Keynes did not deny that changes in the rate of gold
production have an independent effect on prices, but they did not
believe that such changes account for much of the actual movements
in prices.16 Neither realized how fully the cumulative effect of changes
in the U.S. gold stock accounted for the variations in growth of the
money stock of the United States (and probably of all gold-standard
countries) up to World War I, despite the sizable contributions of
the other determinants.Slight modifications of their theory cannot
render it consistent with the evidence. No theory of prices that ignores
the importance of gold production can account for the behavior of the
money stock in the early period, and there is no obvious way to link
the rate of gold production to variations in the demand for loanable
funds.Gold production itself was too small an operation to affect
aggregate demand directly and could only do so indirectly through
the monetary system. Even though one finds nothing seriously wrong
with their theory on logical grounds, therefore, itis empirically ir-
relevant for long-run movements up to World War I.
In the later period, the contribution of the gold ratio to changes in
the money stock correlated closely with price movements, as Table 29
indicates, because the cushioning of gold flows was carried to greater
extremes. Federal Reserve credit outstanding and not the gold stock
has accounted for most of the long-run changes in the money stock
since World War I.Here Keynes' view is consistent with the sources
of change in the money stock, but our interpretation above of the
association between changes in Federal Reserve credit and price move-
ments is different.
The Wickseil-Keynes theory may still be valid for short-run price
movements. Since the theory is based on lags in the behavior of banks,
it describes more appropriately short-run phenomena.Indeed, its
extension to secular developments, where the time span is too long
for most lags to be significant, was a bold step, taken partly to reconcile
classical monetary theory with the Gibson Paradox. Yet, the long-run
behavior of interest rates, while perhaps puzzling, does not alter the
preceding interpretation of the evidence on the association between
money and prices, for that interpretation does not rule out the in-
fluence of other factors on interest rates.
J6 Interest and Prices, p.167, and Lectures on Political Economy. Vol. II,
pp. 204—205; Keynes, A Treatise on Money, Vol. II, p. 206.256 CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION
Since movements in interest rates do not explain the over-all be-
havior of the money stock—as they are supposed to do in the Wicksell-
Keynes theory—what then underlies the Gibson Paradox?'7 Although
no explanation can be firmly established here, one supplied by Irving
Fisher merits attention: the effect of commodity price changes on the
market value of assets, such as bonds, returns on which are fixed in
money terms. A long-continued rise in commodity prices depreciates
the real value of the principal and interest of bonds, and a long-
continued fall appreciates them.Insofar as lenders and borrowers
anticipate changes in the purchasing power of money, bond yields
tend to move in the same direction as those changes, which helps
preserve the real value of the principal and interest of bonds. Bond
prices tend to be lower and nominal yields higher, therefore, when
commodity prices are rising, and the reverse, when commodity prices
are falling.In a perfect adjustment, bond yields in real terms would
be the same as they would have been with expectations of no change
in commodity prices. Because price movements are not anticipated,
at least not always fully, the adjustment will, of course, usually not be
perfect. When price movements have an almost unbroken trend for a
long time, however, part of the adjustment seems likely to occur.
Interest rates will tend to be higher when prices are rising and lower
when prices are falling.
Such an effect still does not explain the Gibson Paradox, which is
based on rising and falling interest rates accompanying like movements
in prices. One further assumption, however, takes care of the dis-
crepancy.Following Fisher, we may suppose that the adjustment
of interest rates, just described, occurs with a lag. When prices are
rising (say), interest rates eventually climb to and stay at a higher
level, but get there slowly, so that for some time the rates rise together
with prices. How fast and how long interest rates will rise depends on
how quickly they react to a change in the trend of prices. The lag
may be expressed mathematically by making the level of interest rates
We may immediately dismiss one popular answer of long standing: that a rise in
interest rates for whatever reason raises costs of production and so leads to a higher
average level of product prices.This fallacy, prominently expounded by Thomas
Tooke over a century ago, was laid to rest by Ricardo and Wicksell, among others
(see \'Vicksell's Lectures on Political Economy, Vol. II, pp. 179—183).It nevertheless
keeps reappearing, though now chiefly in the press and the Congressional Record;
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a function of past rates of change of prices. Viewing this function as a
weighting scheme, we may presume that it entails less emphasis on
rates of change further back in time; if so, the function in many cases
will more or less approximate the current level of prices.For this
reason, movements in the level of prices and interest rates may appear
to be related, though the true relation would still be described by the
preceding function.'8
There is no doubt this effect accounts in some measure for the Gibson
Paradox. But to what extent? Fisher's explanation implies that turns
in bond yields lag behind turns in an index of commodity prices, so
far as long-run movements are concerned.It also implies that the
yields should be more closely correlated with an average of past rates
of change in prices (weighted in some way) than with the concurrent
level of prices.Fisher computed such correlations, using British and
U.S. data, and the results presented in his The Theory of Interest seem
to substantiate his hypothesis. At the same time, his work raises some
doubts. The lag implicit in the results of his correlations is distributed
over decades;it is so long as to seem implausible.It seems too long
when compared with the several years lag of major turns in bond
yields behind those of prices.Fisher invariably displayed ingenuity
in his empirical work but, to this reader's annoyance, he apparently did
not consider the over-all plausibility of his results.
Misgivings about Fisher's empirical evidence have led me to try
alternative tests of his hypothesis. One appealing direct test, now made
possible by data on stock yields, not available when Fisher wrote, is a
comparison of yields on common stocks and bonds. The return on
common stocks is not fixed in money terms, and so their yield should
not be affected by long-run price movements as that of bonds is pre-
sumed to be. According to the Wiclcsell-Keynes theory, on the other
hand, all yields, including those on stocks and other assets, should
Fisherdid not explicitly introduce a lag into his analysis until he tried empirical
verilication, presented in his The Theory of Interest, New York, 1930, Chap. XIX. In
his earlier work he seen-ied to realize the importance of a lag, however, and did refer
to the imperfect adjustment of interest rates to price movements (see "Appreciation
and Interest," Publications of the American Economic Association, Vol. XI, 1896, p. 76;
and The Rate of Interest, New York, 1907, pp. 277—280).
Keynes did not distinguish between an equilibrium rate of interest and movements
towardanequilibrium level. As a result, he overlooked the crucial part lags play in
Fisher's explanation and concluded it could not account for the Gibson Paradox
(see Keynes, A Treatise on Money, pp. 202—203).258 CA USE-A ND-EFFECT RELATION
follow movements in commodity prices.If we compare the money
yield on bonds with that on common stocks, the expectation of Fisher's
hypothesis is that the differential in favor of stocks should widen as
prices fall, and by roughly the amount that bond yields decline; and
the differential should narrow as prices rise by as much as it previously
widened. Under the Wicksell-Keynes hypothesis, stock yields should
behave as bond yields and prices do; what should happen to dif-
ferential yields is not specified.
Such a test, using some U.S. data, is presented in Appendix B. The
results are mixed. As I read the evidence, Fisher's hypothesis appears
to explain the Gibson Paradox in part but may or may not in full.
Whether this evidence shows, in addition, that real rates of interest
were low when commodity prices declined and high when prices rose,
as the classical monetary theory seems to imply, is uncertain. The
question remains open.
One difficulty in judging classical monetary theory by this im-
plication is that the required magnitude of interest-rate movements
cannot be specified.Even granted the implication that real rates
should ease when the money stock grows faster—and conversely—
which is a far from certain proposition for our complex economy, the
question of how much remains. The quantitative effect of changes in
monetary growth depends on many factors, such as the long-run
interest elasticity of demand for loanable funds, the repercussions on
expectations, and so forth—not to mention the difficulty of translating
the effect into specified changes in those interest rates that happen
to be quoted and published.Conceivably, the effect on recorded
bond and stock yields may usually be so slight that we should not
expect to detect it.
Whatever the explanation of the Gibson Paradox, a theory based on
the effect of changes in the demand for loanable funds on interest rates
and prices is inadequate, because such an effect implies a behavior of
the determinants of the money stock which conflicts with our data.
Strictly speaking, therefore, the Paradox is irrelevant to a discussion
of the long-run effects of the money stock on prices. While it neither
proves nor disproves the importance of those effects, it has played an
important part in the historical controversy over the relation between
money and prices.If the past is any guide, the controversy over the
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will not subside until the Gibson Paradox is settled to everyone's
satisfaction.'9
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON SECULAR MOVEMENTS
IN MONEY AND PRICES
The evidence points to a strong effect of money on prices in the long
run. This does not deny other effects. Many nonmonetary factors,
of course, affect prices.Such effects can be interpreted as changes
in the demand to hold money and measured by changes in turnover
or velocity rates. The high correlation between prices and the money
stock shown in Table 29 demonstrates that changes in velocity, what-
ever their explanation, have been comparatively small in the periods
covered. Nonmonetary factors have doubtless affected prices, but as
yet none has been shown to correlate as closely with long-run price
movements as does the money stock.
This result is not surprising. After all, the dollar prices of commod-
ities reflect the value of a dollar. Just as the supply of a commodity
is one of the most important determinants of its value, so it would be
strange if the supply of money did not have important long-run effects
on its value. Yet, this proposition, once widely accepted as obvious,
has come full circle in the work of many writers, who explain the supply
of money by its value and its value by factors unrelated to its supply.
The foregoing discussion has described the main steps of this doctrinal
about-face.2° The behavior of the determinants of the money stock
favors the original proposition.
Furthermore, most of the nonmonetary factors affecting the value
of money are probably independent of its quantity in the long run
(even if not, perhaps, of its concurrent rate of change) and so would
have behaved as they did, whatever had happened to the supply.
The stronger proposition may therefore be warranted:long-run
changes in the money stock have led eventually to a proportional change
10TheGibson Paradox seems to be still with us.For ten years or so following
World War II, prices and bond yields rose.For a different interpretation of this
phenomenon treating the postwar period as a special case, see John G. Gurley,
"Liquidity and Financial Institutions in the Post-war Period," Study of Employment,
Growth, andPriceLevels, Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 25,
Study Paper 14.
20Seealso Rostow, "Explanations of the Great Depression."260 CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION
in prices relative to the level that would otherwise have prevailed.2'
To that extent, one could predict the eventual effect on prices of
changes in the money stock though not the exact level of prices on a
particular date, since there will also be independent and unforeseen
changes in velocity. Even such restricted prediction has great value.
It is near-sighted to belittle monetary effects because they may be slow
to appear. Granted that "in the long run we are all dead," we should
also remember that every day is a long run which brings the con-
sequences of past events.
These findings carry implications for the Connection between
secular movements in prices and aggregate real output.Indexes
measuring the rate of growth of output and productivity in different
sectors of the economy show unmistakable long-run swings, with
turning points that tend to cluster within a few years. Rates of change
in prices show the same tendencies at about the same dates.22 The
conformity of price movements is not perfect and may, of course, be
accidental; the available data cover only a few long swings. Never-
theless, it is not out of the question that more than coincidence is at
work. If so, the preceding conclusion that long-run price movements
are primarily due to changes in the money stock suggests that any
causal connection must run from prices to the output variables. The
only alternative is that changes in the growth of output or of related
variables influence prices by way of the rate of growth of the money
stock—which the present study indicates is very doubtful.23
21Theregression coefficients for the correlations reported in the addendum to
Table 29 (p. 240) support this proposition. The regression function has a slope of
0.87 for all cycles (0.88 including the two earlier cycles reported in note to Table 28),
and does not differ from unity at the 0.05 level of significance.
The proposition in the text differs from the quantity theory of money, as conven-
tionally stated, by relating changes in money and prices rather than the levels of
the two variables.The differenceismore of empirical than of theoretical
importance.
22SeeArthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, New York,
NBER, 1946, pp. 43 1—440. See also the material presented by Moses Abramovitz in
Employment, Growth, and Price Levels, Part 2, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings,
86th Cong., 1st sess., Apr. 1959, pp. 411—466.
On the other hand, Friedman and Schwartz (A Monetary History, Chap. 13) find a
relationship between the degree of stability in the money stock and in output, but not
between their secular rates of change.
23Ifprice changes do affect output in the long run, the question arises how the effect
occurs. Appendix C reviews some of the ways that have been suggested.CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION 261
2. Cyclical Movements in Money, Prices, and Output
The effect of changes in the money stock on prices in the long run
means that such effects must also play a role in short-run business
cycles. The long-run evidence implies little, however, about the im-
portance of these effects in short-run cycles.Although the money
stock sometimes fluctuates widely in the short run, the effect of these
fluctuations could be swamped by other factors. The short-run co-
variation between the rate of change in the money stock and cyclical
fluctuations in economic activity24 (Chapter 1)is close, but it might
result largely from passive movements in the money stock induced by
fluctuations in activity, and only slightly from the influence of money
on prices and output. There need be no contradiction in denying
such passivity for long-run movements and affirming it for short-run
fluctuations, nor in concluding that changes in the money stock are of
primary importance in the long run but of minor importance in the
short run.
Is the money stock in fact largely passive in the short run? One
test of short-run passivity is similar to that just applied to long-run
movements: whether the cyclical behavior of the three determinants
can be fully explained by cyclical fluctuations in prices and real output.
If not, the observed conformity of the rate of change in the money
stock to reference cycles must be either accidental—which is un-
reasonable—or at least in part the result of its effects on the economy.
Although the cyclical behavior of the three determinants is not easy
to interpret, it seems safe to conclude that most of their short-run
variations are closely related to cyclical fluctuations in economic
activity—the opposite of the conclusion reached for the long run.
Such effects provide a plausible explanation of recurring cycles in the
money stock whether or not the reverse effect occurred.
Granted that the money stock is dependent on economic activity
in the short run, does the evidence imply a mutual dependence?
Although much evidence has accumulated, a full answer does not seem
possible at present. Further evidence is provided, however, by a largely
24Itshould be emphasized that, in contrast with the comparison in the preceding
section between long-run movements in the rates of change of both prices and the
money stock, the comparison here for short-run cycles is between the rate of change in
the money stock and the level of economic activity (including both prices and real
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neglected part of the subject, the behavior of the determinants of the
money stock.Two aspects of their behavior are relevant:large
fluctuations, and changes in response to alterations in monetary
institutions and practices.
LARGE FLUCTUATIONS: WAR AND SEVERE CYCLES
These fluctuations are important, not only because they occur in
periods of especial interest, but also because they bring out in bold
relief the relations between the variables.Random disturbances
ordinarily hide these relations but recede into the background in times
of drastic change.
The two major wartime periods of this century in the United States—
World Wars I and TI—saw large increases in the money stock and
roughly proportional increases in price levels,if the changes are
measured from the beginning of hostilities to the postwar year in
which prices stopped rising.Nearly all the increases in the money
stock were due to issues of high-powered money, which in turn re-
flected the wartime exigencies of government finance.Attempts to
raise taxes failed to cover the sudden expansion of military expend-
itures, and the Treasury had to borrow. It sold bonds in large volume
but never enough at the interest rates offered. Since the government
felt that higher rates were undesirable, easing the Treasury's pre-
dicament and easing the bond market went hand in hand. The central
bank's purchases of bonds amounted to financing part of the Treasury's
budget deficit by issuing high-powered money. In view of wartime
experiences the world over, such increases in the money stock were
inevitable.The particular amount. issued, however, was far from
inevitable;the fraction of government expenditures financed by
issuing money is variable. The association between percentage in-
creases in the money stock and prices over each wartime period as a
whole makes it reasonable to attribute the inflation primarily to in-
creases in money. Yet, the associated movements in prices and money
are often explained as common effects of nonmonetary factors.25It
is true that wartime controls on prices and nonmilitary spending
25Thecontention is, in effect, that the price increases were as likely to be matched
by permanent increases in velocity as by increases in the money stock. In fact, how-
ever, wartime price increases throughout the world were invariably accompanied,
during the period as a whole, by large increases in the money stock; the net change in
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sometimes temporarily hide the usual indications of monetary ex-
pansion, which may not appear openly for a year or two after wartime
controls have ended. Moreover, many nonmonetary factors add to
inflationary pressures during wartime, though they are usually tem-
porary and gradually disappear after war's end.To make non-
monetary factors paramount, one must contend that in some way they
also produce the increases in the money stock and do so in rough
proportion to the over-all rise in prices. This implies that these factors
closely determine the issue of high-powered money in wartime, which
is doubtful in view of the almost universal government control over
high-powered money and the varied (but easily identified) reasons
for the particular amounts issued.
However major wartime inflations are interpreted, they arc suf-
ficiently unlike business cycles to warrant separate attention and so
are mostly excluded from the tabulations here pertaining to cyclical
fluctuations.
All severe contractions in U.S.businessactivity have been accom-
panied, during about the first half of their length, by an unusually sharp
decline in the rate of change in the money stock;near its lowest
point, the rate became negative, signifying an absolute decline in the
stock.In mild business contractions the drop in the rate of change
was not nearly so deep and seldom as prolonged.If we take the ref-
erence cycles containing the six largest business contractions as rep-
resenting severe business declines, Table 1 shows that the matching
specific-cycle contractions in the rate of change in the money stock
were also the six largest. (That correspondence applied as well to the
severe reference contraction of 1873—79, the amplitude of which was
not included in Table 1, making seven since the Civil War.) The
patterns of the six declines in monetary growth are shown in relation
to reference cycles, along with the contributions of the three deter-
minants, in Chart 23. The patterns are adjusted to have an average
level of zero. The sign of changes in the currency and reserve ratios is
reversed to show their contributions to the rate of monetary growth.
Most of the declines reached their lowest point in stage VII or VIII.
The first two severe cycles appear to be exceptions, only because the
annual data distort the true pattern. In 1878—85, the full force of the
panic came mainly in fiscal 1884 with a sharp drop in the contributionCHART 23
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(or rise in the level) of the currency ratio (see Chart 1).Stage VII
of this cycle, however, is an average of 1884 and the preceding fiscal
year, and so smoothes out the deep trough produced by the panic.
In 1891—94, the annual data put the panic in stage V, though it
actually occurred in May 1893, four months after the monthly reference
peak in January. The annual data do not permit an independent
computation of the mid-contraction stages.The 1927—33 severe
cycle, therefore, is the only one with a trough in the money series at the
end of the reference contraction; here the banking holiday reversed
theincipient recovery in monetary growth from stage VII to
VIII.
Most severe business contractions have involved financial panics, as
evidenced either by banks' suspension of payments or by issue of
Clearing House loan certificates in New York City.The panics
represented a scramble for currency, in which the public and the
banks attempted to increase the currency and reserve ratios and so
contributed to declines in the rate of change in the money stock.In
two severe business contractions without panics—1921 and 1937—38—
the rate of change also declined, not because of liquidity crises, but
mainly because of reduced contributions from high-powered money—
and, in 1937—38 only, also because of a large increase in reserve require-
ments. In the pre-World War I cycles, gold flows often contributed to
a fall in monetary growth in the early part of business contractions, as
Chart 23 shows.
1-low can this association between monetary growth and the severity
of business contractions be explained? The accompanying financial
panics seem to be a link, because they were responsible for the large
increases in the two ratios, frequently responsible for a sizable part of the
decline in monetary growth. The only exceptions, as already noted, were
1921 and 1937—38. The 1929—33 contraction was not an exception,
because the growing distress of banks in the three years preceding the
1933 holiday had the same effect of drastically increasing the demand
for currency. It is tempting to explain the panics as resulting from the
severity of the accompanying business contractions. Timing incon-
sistencies, however, plague this explanation.Some of the earlier
panics came during the first part of the business contractions (1873,
1890, 1893, 1907) and before the contractions became deep enough
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of 1884, which occurred midway during the long contraction of 1882—
85.(The two later panics of 1914 and 1933, of course, came at the
end of business contractions.)It is extremely doubtful that severe
contractions are, from the beginning, so special a breed that they can
precipitate panics even before their full repercussions hit economic
activity at large. Most panics appear to have reflected special cir-
cumstances, perhaps conditioned by declining business activity, but
not dependent upon a severe contraction or low level of activity. One
might still deny that deep depressions originate in money-stock changes
by contending that they are initiated by panics, which also produce
the ensuing decline in the money stock.This contention asks us to
assign separate economic effects to a panic itself and to the resulting
contraction in bank deposits, ignoring how closely connected they are.
Even if that could be done, the argument stumbles over severe
business contractions in which no panics occurred or, if they did,
occurred late but were not exceptions in terms of the behavior of the
money stock. Two severe business contractions had no panic—1921
and 1937—38—and two had panics that came late—1882—85 and
1929—33. In all four the money stock declined, and in the last, before
and during the panic.Exceptions on other grounds also occurred:
the 1890 and 1914 panics accompanied mild business contractions
and comparatively mild declines in the rate of change in the money
stock, because both had mild repercussions on the banking system.
To explain such inconsistencies, one might argue that a severe
business contraction causes an increase in the reserve ratio because
of a falling demand for loans (it is hard to conceive of other possibilities)
and in this way reduces monetary growth; and that panics are epi-
phenomena with no important effects on either the money stock or
business activity. That is an extreme position.It ignores all we know
about how banking panics jolt the economy, especially when banks sus-
pend payments. In addition, it conflicts with the evidence (see Chapter
5, section 4). Both the reserve and the currency ratios appear to respond
mildly to declines in economic activity, no matter how deep, and
sharply only to financial panics.26Although the currency ratio
recovers quickly after panics, the reserve ratio has a delayed response
and recovers slowly, so that their combined response covers an extended
26Thereserve ratio also responds sharply, of course, to a large increase in reserve
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period.Severe contractions are an important exception, therefore,
to the above statement that fluctuations in business activity seem to
produce the cycles in the money series.For severe contractions, this
effect may explain the timing, but apparently a deep depression cannot
account for the sharp decline in the rate of change in the money stock
associated with it.
Since there have been so few cycles with severe contractions and
banking panics for which there exists the documentation needed to
draw inferences, the evidence is admittedly limited and any con-
clusion, necessarily tentative.Still, the evidence just reviewed makes
no sense if monetary developments are assumed to have played a
minor role.Without that assumption, each piece falls in place:
panics made ordinary business contractions severe when they led to
substantial decline in the rate of monetary growth, and not otherwise.
Substantia[ decline in this rate, by itself with no panic, could and has
produced severe business contractions.The variety of reasons for
decline in monetary growth during severe depressions rules out any
single cause and rules out, in particular, a sharp fall in business activity
as the main reason for the associated decline in monetary growth.
The evidence istherefore consistent with and, taken as a whole,
impressively favors emphasis on the decline in the rate of monetary
growth as the main reason some business contractions, regardless of
what may have initiated them, became severe.
This proposition is hardly novel, though the supporting evidence is
much stronger than is generally recognized.Yet, severe business
contractions are often cited as a prime example of how unimportant
monetary factors are.The period most often cited is the 1930's.
Although it is widely conceded that the panic in 1933 made the business
contraction worse, one event allegedly buries all monetary interpre-
tations of that period and settles the issue—the several years' failure
of monetary expansion to usher in full employment.
The failure does not, however, prove monetary effects to be un-
important. The events can be interpreted differently. A large part
of the increases in the money stock after the spring of 1933 only restored
what the preceding decline had destroyed. Those increases and the
following ones were accompanied by the rise of prices and output
from the depths of the depression.Indeed, the expansion of real
income from 1933 to 1937 proceeded at a faster rate than that during268 CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION
any other four-year period since 1869 and roughly matched in mag-
nitude the rate of decline from 1929 to 1933. That employment did
not absorb the intervening growth in the labor force for many years
proves only that full recovery from a very iow level takes time, not to
mention the uncertainties of government policies and other develop-
ments disturbing to business confidence during the New Deal era.
The contraction of 1937—38 also delayed the return to full employment.
The failure of monetary expansion after 1933 to achieve full employ-
ment by 1937 has been likened to the futile gesture of pushing on a
limp string; but the analogy should be changed to pushing on a taut
coil spring, which compresses—but not indefinitely.
In any event, the efficacy of expansion in that recovery,
however assessed, does not bear upon the capability of monetary
factors to deepen contractions.
ALTERATIONS IN MONETARY INSTITUTIONS AND
PRACTICES:MILD CYCLES
Although the evidence points to a crucial role of the money stock
in severe business contractions, it need not follow that its role in mild
cycles is equally important. For one thing, mild business contractions
have none of the features of a financial disturbance. Money markets
do not thrash about in panic;interest rates ease as the decline in
demand for loanable funds outweighs rising liquidity preference by
lenders; and banks do not take strong steps to increase their reserve
ratios. Under such conditions, nonmonetary factors appear relatively
important, and we do not know to what extent they are set off or
aggravated by declining growth in the money stock. Although the
cyclical patterns of the money series and the three determinants cannot
definitely indicate the cause-and-effect relations, we may examine
their behavior from the point of view of summarizing the answers they
suggest to this question.
To show the contributions of the three determinants to monetary
growth in a way that relates their movements to fluctuations in eco-
nomic activity, Chart 23 presents reference cycle patterns for cycles
with severe business contractions, and Chart 24 presents the patterns
for cycles with mild contractions. This second chart shows two later
cycles not included in the cyclical analyses in preceding chapters.
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noted earlier.(1) The patterns are adjusted to have an average level
of zero.(2) The sign of changes in the currency and reserve ratios is
reversed to show their contribution to the rate of change in the money
stock.(3) These patterns are somewhat dissimilar from those for
specific cycles, summarized in Chart 2, because matching stages of
specific and reference cycle patterns, after the timing lead of the specific
cycles is taken into account, have different time spans.27Specific
cycle peaks often correspond in time to stage II or III of matching
reference cycles, for example, and the two stages differ appreciably in
the length of the periods encompassed. For this and the additional
reason that rate-of-change series are highly volatile, these reference
cycle patterns do not always exhibit the position of the peak and.
trough accurately.(Specific cycle turning points are given in Table
1.)Finally, Chart 24 reveals considerable diversity among cycles,
which reflects in part the variable timing relation between the cyclical
turning points in money and the corresponding reference turns.
Consequently, the average patterns, presented at the bottom of the
chart, have less amplitude than do most of the individual patterns,
and fail to catch some of the typical movements. The averages are
presented to indicate that the earlier and later subgroups are very
similar for the money stock and the currency ratio, but not for high-
powered money and the reserve ratio. For comparing the movements
with business cycles, we should not rely exclusively on the average
patterns.
On a reference cycle basis, the rate of monetary growth has a peak
in stages I to III.The only exception among these nonwar mild
cycles is 1888—91, for which the annual data put the peak in stage V.
Following the peak, the rate falls to a trough usually in stages \T and
VII.(In a few cycles the trough comes earlier or later.) The rise
following the trough is often broken by a decline in the last stages of
the reference contraction.
The individual patterns for the growth rate of high-powered money
differ considerably.Before World War I, the patterns commonly
show a trough in stage III or V and little accord with respect to the
peak. In the later period, by contrast, they most typically rise to a
peak in stage III. The growth rate then usually declines until stage
Also, the underlying series differ slightly (see notes to Table F-I), but this
difference should not matter much.270
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Reference Cycle Patterns of the Rate of Change in the Money Stock and the Contributions
of the Three Determinants, Nonwar Cycles with Mild Business Contractions, 1885—1961
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VII or VIII, though sometimes the decline is interrupted by a rise from
stage IV or V to stage VI or VII.
The contribution of the currency ratio most often displays an
inverted pattern with a trough near the reference peak. In terms of
movements in the level of the ratio, this pattern reflects a diminishing
rate of decline during the first part of reference cycles, in which the
ratio levels off from stage IV to VII and then starts to fall again in the
final stages. These movements in the level of the ratio approximate a
sine curve with a trough at stage III and a peak at stage VII (see
Chart 11).
The contribution of the reserve ratio has a markedly different
pattern before and after World War I or even, perhaps, after the turn
of the century. In the earlier period it usually rose until stage III and
fell thereafter, which reflected, in terms of movements in the level of
the ratio, a fall at a diminishing rate during reference expansions and a
moderate rise during reference contractions. The contribution of the
ratio after World War I, as shown by its average pattern at the bottom
of Chart 24, is inverted, but this is mostly due to some large changes in
reserve requirements, particularly in 1948—49, 1953—54, and (owing to
a sharp rise in time deposits relative to demand deposits) in 1960—61.
If we exclude these movements, the reserve ratio has no clearly defined
cyclical pattern in the later period, which manifests a tendency,
first noticeable around the turn of the century and continuing except
during the 1930's, of banks to keep reserves fairly close to required
amounts in all phases of the business cycle.
To describe the cyclical behavior of the money stock does not, of
course, explain it.Chapters 3 to 5 analyze the evidence.It seems
highly probable that cyclical fluctuations in business activity account
for most of the cyclical variations in growth of the money stock, al-
though many variations in particular years can be traced to special
monetary developments largely unrelated to concurrent business con-
ditions. The pattern of money-stock changes shown in Chart 24 can
also be interpreted as supporting that explanation. The patterns
may be viewed as having an inverted conformity to business cycles
with approximately coincident or perhaps somewhat lagging turning
points. That is, peaks in monetary growth correspond to reference
troughs, and monetary troughs correspond to reference peaks. By this
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growth and accounts forthe correspondence of turning points.
On the additional assumption that changes in monetary growth affect
the economy after a fairly short lag, it may be concluded that they
work to dampen fluctuations occurring for other reasons in business
activity.
The length of the lag in monetary effects is, of course, crucial to this
interpretation.If the lag is long—which is not implausible in view of
the institutional arrangements by which changes in the money stock
work into the economy—there may also be, in addition to the inverted
relation, a positive relation (Table 1) between money and business
activity, with a considerable time difference between turning points.
By this second interpretation, the effect of business activity on money
produces an inverted pattern and, at the same time, the effect of money
on business produces a leading positive pattern.
While it is difficult to measure the relative importance of these two
relations and to determine whether the second effect contributes
significantly to the observed association, there is some evidence sug-
gesting that it does.First, the timing relation between turning points
in the money series and reference cycles seems to show less variability
on a positive than on an inverted basis.28In line with the foregoing
argument, this suggests that the effect of money on business activity
is the more consistent relation. This finding alone is not conclusive,
because of the practical difficulties of dating turning points in the rate
of monetary growth, and because of the fundamental pitfalls in
measuring a complicated relationship between two series solely by
their turning points.
Another piece of evidence is the persistence of the association over
time. No significant secular change in the relative timing or amplitude
of cyclical movements in the money stock and business activity is
evident for the period since the 1870's, the con-
siderable variability in these measures from cycle to cycle and the
changes in the relative contributions and patterns of the three deter-
minants (Chapter 2).If the direction of influence ran from economic
activity to the money stock but not the other way, the association
between the two ought by all odds to bear evidence of the substantial
28Thisevidence is presented and discussed by Friedman and Schwartz in "Trends
and Cycles in the Stock of Money in the United States, 1867—1960," a National
Bureau study, in preparation, Chap. 5;a preliminary presentation appears in
Forty-Fourth Annual Report, NBER, 1964, pp. 14—18.274 CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATiON
changes in our monetary institutions over the past seventy-five years.
These changes have involved all three determinants.
(1) High-powered money has been issued over the period under
radically different institutional arrangements. A new source of issue—
Federal Reserve Banks—has been introduced, which apparently in-
creased the dependence of this determinant on movements in the two
ratios.Restrictions on international trade here and abroad have
interfered with the operation of the gold-flow mechanism.The
Treasury, from time to time, has in other ways expanded or contracted
the quantity of high-powered money outstanding.
(2)Legislation has substantially altered the banking structure.
The Federal Reserve Act and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act have
regulated banking operations, and many other federal and state laws
have in various ways restricted the money market and all its related
institutions. The latter developments have touched banking directly,
and also indirectly, by reducing the risk of bank defaults and by shifting
the comparative advantages of deposits and other financial assets. The
conformity of the money stock to business cycles is often explained
by the effect of market credit demands on the reserve ratio.Yet,
though such demands presumably behave the same today as before
1914, the importance of this determinant has changed considerably.
Except during panics, the reserve ratio has contributed much less to
cycles in the rate of change in the money stock under the Federal
Reserve than under the national banking system.
(3) The behavior of the currency ratio has undoubtedly been
affected, though in a manner and degree hard to determine, by
various developments in the economy at large.Financial assets have
taken new forms, reordering the relative advantages of the different
ways in which people hold wealth. The relative amounts of money
balances held by various sectors of the economy have shifted with
likely effects on the aggregate demand for currency. Changes in the
manner and means of making payments have altered earlier practices
in the relative use of currency and deposits.
These well-known developments might have been expected to
produce changes also in the response of each determinant to external
influences and hence to changes in the effect of fluctuations in general
activity on the money stock. And, indeed, the cyclical patterns of the
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(according to the analysis, mostly the patterns of high-powered money,
less so of the reserve ratio, and least of all of the currency ratio). Yet,
we still observe no important change in the timing and amplitude of
the money stock relative to business activity. One reason could be that
the uniformity of this association over time reflects a different effect
not appreciably touched by the institutional developments, the effect
of changes in the money stock on business activity. Though undoubt-
edly altered to some degree by institutional developments, this effect
has probably escaped their full force, remaining comparatively the
same in form and magnitude. A reorganization of financial institutions
is likely to affect the manner and means in which they supply their
product and not so much the impact of changes in that supply on
other sectors.
The behavior of the currency ratio is particularly relevant to this
question. Its correspondence to cycles in the money series and business
activity remained high over the entire period examined, and even in the
cycles after 1914, when the offset produced by high-powered money
appears to have increased in certain stages.If the contribution of the
currency ratio was offset to a large degree, how could it continue to
correspond to both the money stock and business activity? We should
expect cycles in the money series to take on a different pattern and
timing as a result of the offsets, and so no longer to correspond to
cycles in the currency ratio, which conformed to fluctuations in
business activity. One explanation of the dual correspondence is that
business cycles were set in train by changes in the money stock
and, in turn, produced corresponding movements in the currency
ratio.
These arc qualitative considerations; though relevant and suggestive
so far as they go, their importance is hard to assess. We can not easily
measure institutional developments or quantify the effects they might
have had on the relation between money and economic activity. The
evidence for the importance of monetary effects in severe cycles
supports a presumption that similar effects operate during mild cycles
in smaller absolute magnitude, regardless of what produces the changes
in the money stock. The preceding evidence leaves open whether
the magnitude of the effects in mild cycles is just as large or is
smaller relativeto the amplitude of the fluctuations in economic
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IMPLICATIONS OF MUTUAL DEPENDENCE
A mutual dependence between the money stock and economic
activity, if it exists, has important implications for the self-generation
of cycles. These implications can be explored by outlining the form
of a self-generating, purely monetary business cycle suggested by the
preceding analysis.The discussionwillbepartlyhypothetical,
because the preceding evidence does not firmly establish the relative
importance of the two parts of the mutual dependence. The ex-
ploration may nevertheless shed light on an aspect of business fluc-
tuations that has been largely neglected in much recent research on
cycle models.
In very simple terms, the evidence examined suggests that economic
activity has a lagged relation, in some undetermined form, to past
rates of change in the money stock; and the past rates of change are
related to economic activity, perhaps also with a lag, most likely short.
An initial rise (or fall) in business activity induces a rise (fall) in the
rate of change in the money stock which, after the lag period, produces
a further rise (fall) in activity. For a while the mutual stimulation is
reinforcing. A cyclical movement occurs because of limits to short-run
expansions or contractions in the money stock, which produce turning
points in its rate of change. Because of these limits, a rise (for example)
in aggregate activity induces a rise in the rate of change in the money
stock during the early stages of a cyclical expansion—but not in-
definitely.Soon the monetary system begins to reach the end of its
expansionary capabilities, and the rate of growth of the money stock
slows down, even though aggregate activity continues to rise.After
the lag period, the slowing down takes the steam out of the expansion
in aggregate activity and eventually causes it to turn down. The
sequence is similar for contractions and upturns.29
This model of a monetary cycle is similar to those of Hawtrey and
of Mitchell30 and many other writers. Aside from the findings pre-
sented here about the behavior and timing of turning points in the
29AppendixD presents a mathematical formulation of this model.
30SeeR. G. Hawtrey, "The Trade Cycle," Readings in Business Cycle Theory, Phila-
delphia, Blakiston, 1944, pp. 330—349; and Mitchell, Business Cycles and Their Causes,
reprint, Part III of Business Cycles, University of California Press, 1950, especially
pp. 47—52, 77—107, 137—139. For the same ideas presented in a different form, see
J. R. Hicks, A Contribution to the Theory of the Trade Cycle, London, Oxford, 1950,
Chap. XI. See also L. R. Ayres, Turning Points in Business Cycles, New York, 1939,
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three determinants, theirs differ from the foregoing chiefly in relating
activity to the level of the money stock rather than to its rate of change.
If we inserted in the foregoing model "money stock" for "rate of
change," the model would be identical with theirs, apart from certain
details. The evidence suggests that this difference is important.If
one looks at its level without adjustment for trend, the money stock
seems to lag behind turns in aggregate activity, and the association
between the two appears weak and irregular.\'Vith the rate of change
in the money stock, however—or what is similar in practice though not
in concept, deviations of the stock from its long-run trend31—the
association appears fairly close.Hawtrey's and Mitchell's theories
are not inconsistent with this form of the relation, but their emphasis
on the level of the money stock led many to conclude erroneously that
the association was not very close in any form.
The dimensions of the variables used in the model sketched here,
whether appropriate or not, do not affect the analysis of the behavior
of the three determinants.Their cyclical behavior was related to
business cycles without deciding whether changes in the level or the
rate of change in economic activity was more important. The choice
of dimensions mainly affects the timing relation between the variables.
If one accepts the interpretation of the evidence presented here—or
goes somewhat further than this evidence can justify—and designates
the preceding monetary model of the cycle as a full explanation, the
validity of many other models of the business cycle is not necessarily
thereby denied, though the rationalizations for them would then be
different in some respects. The reason is that such models can be more
or less descriptively accurate even though incomplete.There is
nothing in the preceding model that rules out, or even makes unlikely,
cyclical relations between income, consumption, investment in plant
and equipment or inventories, and other variables depicted in the
well-known multiplier-accelerator model in all its versions. Indeed, the
latter model seems quite consistent with the purely monetary model
just described. One can make a long list of other relations that might
hold for cyclical movements, whatever the initial source of instability.
If the preceding monetary model is valid (in the sense of descriptive
ClarkWarburton uses this method.See his "The Misplaced Emphasis in
Contemporary Business-Fluctuation Theory" in Readings in Monetary Theory, American
Economic Association, 1951, especially pp. 296—300.278 CAUSE-AND-EFFECT RELATION
accuracy), these other models may or may not be valid; the case is
in no way prejudiced. Nevertheless, given the validity of the monetary
model, these other models must be incomplete—in the sense of omitting
"important" elements of the cyclical process—as also the purely
monetary model would be if any of the other models proved to be
valid.
Business cycle research has found so many sources of instability in
our economy that it would be rash indeed to suggest that money-stock
changes are the main one.Aside from possible government stabili-
zation, an industrial economy will undergo fluctuations stemming
from the ubiquitous lags and rigidities, which prevent instantaneous
adjustments to changes in demand. Lagged adjustments tend to be
accentuated and prolonged by the interdependence of many economic
variables, a process that the various "multipliers" and "accelerators"
help to describe.Nevertheless, the evidence on deep depressions
suggests that our largest disturbances are intensified by contractions
in the money stock and otherwise would probably not have been
nearly so severe. The ordinary garden variety of cyclical pest also
seems to be nourished by changes in the money stock; whether and
to what degree it is bred by these changes, however, cannot be clearly
determined from the evidence presented here.